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Abstract 
This paper introduces the Ponder language for 
specibing distributed object enterprise concepts. Ponder, 
is a declarative language, which permits the specifcation 
of policies in terms of obligations, permissions and 
prohibitions and provides the means for defining roles, 
relationships and their configurations in nested 
communities. Ponder provides a concrete representation of 
most of the concepts of the Enterprise Viewpoint. The 
design of the language incorporates lessons drawn from 
several years of research on policy for securit?, and 
distributed systems management as well as policy conflict 
analysis. The various language constructs are presented 
through a scenario for the operation, administration and 
maintenance of a mobile telecommunication network. 
1. Introduction 
The ODP Reference Model Enterprise Viewpoint [ 11 
defines concepts for specifying an abstraction of a system 
within a defined environment in terms of the system’s 
purpose, its scope and the policies that apply to the system 
from its environment as well as those defined within the 
system. The current specification defines terms such as 
policy, role, domain, and community but there is no 
associated language by which a system can be clearly 
specified, analysed or implemented. 
Ponder is a language for specifying Security and 
Management policy for distributed systems [ 2 ] ,  which has 
evolved over a number of years from the Policy Based 
Management work at Imperial College [3],[4],[5]. The 
main motivation for this language is to specify policies that 
are interpreted by components in the system. The policies 
can then be easily modified in order to change the 
behaviour of the system without re-implementation of the 
components. We define policy as a rule governing the 
choices in behaviour of the system. Policies are derived 
from the high level goals (c.f. purpose) of an enterprise or 
from contracts defining Service Level Agreements. 
Although Ponder was not originally designed as an 
Enterprise Viewpoint Language, it does provide a concrete 
representation to “realise” most of the tangible concepts 
being defined for the Enterprise Viewpoint. However, 
there is not a one-to-one mapping between Enterprise 
concepts and Ponder constructs, nor do we attempt to 
model some of the more abstract ones such as “purpose” 
and “objective”. Ponder also defines additional concepts 
such as delegation and relationships. 
Ponder is a declarative, object-oriented language for 
specifying different types of policies, for grouping policies 
into roles and relationships, and then defining 
configurations of roles and relationships as management 
structures. Ponder can be used to specify security policies 
with role-based access control, as well as general-purpose 
management policies. Although it is a typed language, 
Ponder offers a high degree of flexibility by supporting 
parameterisation of any parts of a specification. We have 
assumed a class-based object-oriented view of the 
underlying distributed system where interaction occurs 
through remote object invocations and asynchronous event 
notifications. Ponder’s types and instances are 
implemented as objects in the system and therefore policies 
may also apply to these objects. 
The next section outlines a simplified GSM mobile 
telecommunications enterprise that is used as a scenario to 
illustrate the concepts presented in this paper. Section 3 
covers management structures that define the 
organisational units (communities) as configurations of 
roles and section 4 explains how to specify the main 
Ponder policies relating to authorisation and obligation. In 
sections 5 and 6 we elaborate on roles, relationships and 
additional types of policies. Related work is covered in 
section 7 followed by conclusions. 
2. Scenario 
In this scenario, we consider the enterprise components 
needed to distribute the management responsibilities of the 
cellular network of an imaginary operator RCom. We will 
limit our specifications to a simplified subset of the 
functions needed for the management of Base Station Sub- 
systems (BSS) and subscriber data. We assume that 
RCom’s network is divided into regions with several 
branches. 
Figure 1 is a schematic representation of the network 
components in our GSM mobile network scenario. We 
have assumed an object interface to network components 
and abstract events that do not correspond to the GSM 
specifications [7]. GSM uses TMN concepts for 
management and SS7 for network signalling. 
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Domains [6] are used to group 
references to objects and sub-domains 
in a structure similar to that of a file 
system directory. However, domains 
may hold references to any type of 
objects including a person and objects 
can be members of multiple domains 
i.e., domains can overlap. 
Domains have been implemented 
as directories in an extended LDAP 
Service. Ponder domains are merely a 
grouping construct, similar to the ODP 
group, so differ from ODP domains 
which have a single controller role that 
controls roles with respect to a specific 
aspect of their behaviour. In most of 
our case studies, we have found it 
more practical to separate manager 
agents into different domains from the 
objects they manage, as this allows 
different policies to be specified for 
Base 
Transceiver 
Stations 
(BTS) 
BTS 
Base 
connection Station 
-- + Controllers 
control BSC BSC 
Figure 1. GSM system overview different managers regarding common set of objects. A 
Ponder Domain could be used to model the ODP domain 
in that it could hold a controlling object plus controlled 
objects if there is a need to do so. 
Figure 2 shows the partial domain structure within the 
Wales region with one branch (Cardiff) expanded. Sub- 
domains can be created in the Cardiff branch to group roles, 
policy objects and network elements. Different domains 
have been created for the operations network (opn) and the 
telecommunications network (tn) containing the Mobile 
Switching Centre (MSC), Visitors Location Register 
(VLR) and the Base Station Controllers (BSC). However, 
regional policies, implemented by managers in a regional 
operations centre, may also be defined for the uniform 
In large-scale systems, there is a need to group objects 
in order to apply a common policy, to partition 
management responsibility and authority, to reflect 
geographical or organisational boundaries or for the 
convenience of human managers. For example, RCom's 
national network could be divided into 4 or 5 regions, 
corresponding to different local carriers that maintain their 
own Home Location Registers (HLRs). Each region could 
be further sub-divided into a number of branches, each 
corresponding to the coverage area of a Mobile Switching 
Service Centre (MSC) that covers approximately 800,000 
inhabitants according to [8]. Regions and branches 
correspond to ODP communities. logging strategy of all BSCs in the 
region. Hence, the BSC sub-domain 
of the cardiff branch may also be 
included in a sub-domain (cardiff) of 
the regional domain of Base Station 
Sub-systems (BSS). The Cardiff tn  
domain is then overlapping with the 
regional BSS domain. Help-desk 
staff in a branch may need to access 
the HLR and the Equipment Identity 
Register (EIR) in order to update 
subscriber information. It is 
therefore useful to also include the 
regional HLR and EIR in the local 
scope of the tn domain of a branch 
in order to simplify policy 
specification. The HLR and EIR can 
then be referred to as local objects at 
the branch level. 
Path names can be used to 
identify domains and objects in the 
configuration, or 
root domain for Wales region 
tn 
(telecom network) 
I 
policies re1 o n  
a// pol x objects (relationships) (opekhons (telecom 
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Figure 2 Regional domain structure (shaded boxes represent non-domain objects) 
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domain structure e.g., /waleslbrancheslcardiffltn/VLR 
refers to the VLR of the cardiff branch in region wales of 
the national network (root domain - '/'). Policies are 
specified in terms of set expressions formed from 
domains, so objects can be added and removed from 
domains without having to change the policy 
specifications. Policies applying to a domain normally 
propagate to members of sub-domains so a policy 
applying to /wales/branches/cardiff/tn will also apply to all 
BSCs managed within the branch. 
3. Management Structures 
A branch in the operation of a GSM network is an 
organisational unit which ensures the management and 
administration of the elements within the coverage area of 
an MSC and provides the customer service support within 
that area. In Ponder the representation of an organisational 
unit is called a management structure (mstruct) and groups 
the specifications of the various roles and their inter- 
relationships. Hence, a management structure realises the 
Enterprise Viewpoint concept of a community which 
defines a configuration of roles formed to meet an 
objective; in this case to manage part of the GSM network. 
Within a branch we have considered the following types of 
roles: 
Help-Desk Staff (HD) provide the interface between 
customers and RCom (not elaborated in this scenario). 
Telephone Service Engineers (TSE) investigate faults 
occurring on the radio interface between mobile 
stations and base transceiver stations and determine 
whether a base network operator should be alerted to 
deal with the fault. 
Base Network Operators - Switches (BNoS) are 
responsible for managing the Mobile Switching service 
Centre (MSC) and Visitors Location Register (VLR) 
situated in a branch and cooperate with the BNoRs for 
Radio related functions. 
Base Network Operators - Radio (BNoR) are 
responsible for Base Transceiver Systems (BTS) and 
cooperate with the TSEs. 
Network Element Administrators (NEA) perform all 
on-site management tasks requested by BNoS and 
BNoR. They may initiate tests and configuration 
procedures defined in the Operations Management 
Centre Workstations (OMC). 
The configuration of roles and their inter-relationships 
for the branch is shown in Figure 3 where inter-role 
relationships have been represented by arrows. Unlike the 
Enterprise Viewpoint, Ponder has an explicit construct for 
defining relationships between roles which group the 
obligations and permissions of the roles towards each 
other, e.g., right to assign a task to a role, and policies with 
regards to the use of shared resources. 
-, 
Branch 
\ I_ /-CustomerCarej f Net. Elt. Managment ' 
HD1 HD2 NEAl 
U 
4 I 
TSE BNoR - BNoS 
Figure 3 Branch Management Structure 
The branch management structure is itself sub-divided 
in two management structures - one responsible for the 
customer care and the other responsible for the 
management of network elements. The customer care 
structure groups the help-desk roles and the telephone 
service engineer role that is responsible for investigating 
failures. Network element administrators and base network 
operators are grouped in the network element management 
structure. This configuration can be specified in Ponder as 
follows: 
type mstruct branch (domain br, nw) [ 
import ltypelcustcare; ltypelnetelements; 
inst mstruct cc = custcare (br, nw); 
ne = netelements (br, nw); 
type re1 radiofail (role eng, radio-op) ( ... ) 
inst re1 f = radiofail (cc.tse, ne.bnor) ; 
I 
domain c = ... lwaleshrancheslcardiffl; 
inst mstruct cardiff = branch (c, cltnl); 
The branch type, declared with the keyword mstruct 
takes two parameters, the domain br in which it resides and 
the domain nw in which the various network elements 
reside. Like any other composite type in Ponder, an 
mstruct can contain any number of type declarations, and 
any number of instances, declared as two blocks with the 
keywords type and inst above. Ponder does not impose 
limits on the number of these blocks or their ordering. A 
type specification may also contain constraints (not shown 
here, but see section 6.4) and may import type declarations 
from a type repository. In this example, type specifications 
for the custcare and netelements mstructs have been 
imported and one instance of each has been created within 
the branch. The branch mstruct type also contains the 
declaration of a relationship type and its instantiation. The 
relationship instance f specifies the policies governing the 
behaviour of the TSEs and of the BNoRs towards each 
other. An mstruct may contain roles, policies, groups of 
policies, relationships and other mstructs. Finally, an 
instance of the branch is created for the Cardiff area. 
Similarly we specify below the mstruct types for the 
custcare and netelements structures from Figure 3. 
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type mstruct 
import 
domain 
inst role 
inst re1 
1 
type mstruct 
import 
domain 
inst role 
inst re1 
custcare (domain br, nw) { 
/type/ helpdesk; /type/ engineer, /t y pelcomplaint, 
r = br/roles/; h = br/roles/hd/; s = br/rel/; 
hhd l  = 
h/hd2 = 
r/tse = engineer (nw/vlr, nw/eir); 
s/hdl-tse = complaint (hdl, tse); 
s/hd2_tse = complaint (hd2, tse); 
helpdesk ( ... ); 
helpdesk ( ... ); 
netelements (domain br, nw) ( 
administrator, switch-op; radio-op; repair; base; 
r = br/roles/; a = rhea/; s = br/rel/; 
a/neal = administrator ( ... ) ; 
a/nea2 = administrator ( ... ) ; 
r/bnos = switch-op (nw/bsc/, nw/msc) ; 
r/bnor = radio-op (nw/bsc/) ; 
slbnos-neal = switch-repair (bnos, neal); 
s/bnos_nea2 = switch-repair (bnos, nea2); 
s/bnor-neal = radio-repair (bnor, neal); 
s/bnor_nea2 = radio-repair (bnor, nea2); 
s/bnos-bnor = base (bnos, bnor); 
Federation between existing management structures 
can be accomplished by importing mstruct instances from a 
domain and creating new policies or relationships with 
respect to existing roles. 
4. Authorisation, Obligation, Refrain and 
Policy hierarchies 
The main types of basic policies in Ponder are 
authorisations, obligations and refrain. Additional types of 
policies such as delegations and filtered authorisations are 
presented in Section 6. Authorisations can be either 
positive (permissions) or negative (prohibitions) and define 
the actions that a set of subjects (objects) are permitted or 
prohibited from performing on a set of target objects under 
given conditions. Subjects are any objects initiating an 
action such as a remote method invocation within the 
system. Targets are any objects on which actions are 
performed. Conditions are specified by constraints 
expressed in a subset of the Object Constraint Language 
(OCL) [l 11. Obligations specify which actions subjects 
must perform on a given set of target objects when notified 
of the occurrence of a particular event and refrain policies 
specify which actions subjects must refrain from 
performing. 
Note that there are a some differences between Ponder 
policies and policies in the Enterprise Viewpoint 
specification. An Enterprise Viewpoint authorisation “is a 
prescription that a particular behaviour must not be 
prevented” and a permission defines a “prescription that a 
particular behaviour is allowed to occur. A permission is 
equivalent to there being no obligation for the behaviour 
not to occur.” The latter assumes a semantic similar to that 
considered in Standard Deontic Logic [12] but the 
difference between authorisation and permission does not 
seem to be meaningful in a computing system. Ponder 
authorisations specify a prescription that the access control 
system associated with the target objects should permit the 
specified actions. Ponder authorisations do not imply 
obligations. While deontic logic may prove useful for 
reasoning about policies, it does not provide a clear 
mapping onto implementation mechanisms. Enterprise 
Viewpoint prohibitions can be realised by negative Ponder 
authorisations and Ponder refrain policies. A negative 
authorisation is a prescription on the behaviour of the 
access control system which protects the target objects 
while a refrain policy is a prescription on the behaviour of 
the subject of the policy (see Section 4.3 below). 
4.1. Authorisation 
Authorisation policies define what actions a set of 
objects in a subject domain are permitted or prohibited to 
perform on a set of objects in a target domain. In the 
context of our case study, the following examples can be 
defined. 
domain network = ... /tn/ ; staff = ... ; accounting = ... ; 
/* Help-desk staff are allowed to add, trace and lock 
subscribers in the HLR during office hours */ 
inst auth+ helpdesk-access { 
subject staff/helpdesk/ ; 
target network/hlr ; 
action add, trace, lock; 
when time.between (“0800, “1 700) ; 
/* Help-desk staff are not permitted to initiate traces on 
1 
foreign subscribers */ 
inst auth- helpdesk-deny ( 
subject staff/helpdesW ; 
target network/vlr ; 
action trace-foreign ; 
I 
Authorisation policies specify subject and target 
domains, (optionally, the type of objects within the 
domains) and the actions that are permitted or prohibited. 
Constraints may be used to restrict applicability to a 
particular time interval as in the above examples (time is a 
library object), according to the state of the subjects, 
targets or other system objects, or according to the action 
parameters. For example, a variation of the policy 
helpdesk-access above can be written as: 
inst auth+ alt-helpdesk-access { 
subject staff/helpdesk/ ; 
target networwhlr ; 
action lock (sid) ; 
when accounting/billgayments.unpaid-bills(sid) ; ] 
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In this policy the parameter of the action lock is bound 
to the local variable sid (subscriber id) and help-desk staff 
are permitted to lock a subscriber, thereby preventing him 
from using the phone when the subscriber has failed to pay 
the bills. The presence of unpaid bills is checked for by 
calling the unpaid-bills function of the bill-payments object 
in the accounting domain. The domain structure presented 
in Section 2 is used to maintain references to all accessible 
system objects. Hence, policies may refer to these objects, 
for example in a constraint, by using their path-name 
within the domain structure. Policy constraints are 
specified using a subset of the OCL operators. 
All policies can be defined as a policy type which is 
used to create policy instances with instantiation 
parameters to tailor the instance to its particular 
environment, i.e., to the particular objects to which it 
refers. For example, there will be similar policies in all the 
branches of RCom, but the policies will apply to particular 
people and equipment in each branch. Thus, the following 
policy type can be written for the policy helpdesk-access 
and instantiated with different subjects and targets. Note 
however that Ponder allows any elements of a policy to be 
parameterised including constraints and actions. This 
provides the flexibility needed to create multiple instances 
of a policy to perform actions in different circumstances 
such as different time intervals or different states of the 
subjects. 
type auth+ al-type (subject nea, target <bsc-type> bsc) { 
action shutdown, reset; 
when time.between(”0800”, “1 7 0 0 )  ; ) 
inst auth+ helpdesk-access = al-type (roleshed, branch/tn) ; 
Note: when the keywords subject or target are used as 
formal parameters, they act as a short form for a set 
parameter plus a subject/target declaration, e.g. the above 
is a short form for the following policy type declaration: 
type auth+ al-type (set nea, set <bsc-typez bsc) { 
subject nea; 
target bsc; 
action shutdown, reset; 
when time.between(“0800”, “1 7 0 0 )  ; ) 
In this example the actions are restricted to objects of type 
bsc-type within the bsc set passed as parameter. 
4.2. Obligation 
Obligation policies specify which actions subjects must 
perform on a domain of target objects in response to an 
event, with constraints similar to those for authorisation 
policies. An action could be a remote invocation on a 
target object, a local operation within the subject or a local 
script written in any suitable language. In the following 
example, the triggering event is specified with the keyword 
on and is followed by the actions that must be performed. 
Obligation policies can specify a sequence of actions using 
the ‘->’ operator or parallel actions using the ‘11’ operator. 
/* On a TX circuit failure, replace the circuit with a backup, and in 
parallel reconfigure the BTS with logging the failure. */ 
type oblig faicreconfigure (subject s, set b) { 
on failure (cir, bts, bsc); 
target f = b A (bsc}; 
do f.disable(bts, cir) -> 
(f.enable(bts, “backup”) 1 1  s.log (cir, bts, bsc)) ; ) 
inst oblig p = faiLreconfigure (.../roles/bnor/, ... /tn/bsc) ; 
This policy specifies that on the occurrence of a 
transmission failure event, BNoRs must disable the failed 
circuit and enable the backup circuit on the base 
transceiver system (BTSj. Note, that the attributes of the 
event are bound to the local variables cir, bts, and bsc 
thereby identifying the failed transmission circuit (cirj, the 
BTS to which the circuit belongs (bts), and the base station 
controller (bsc) to which the BTS is attached. The 
identifier for the failed circuit and for the BTS are used as 
parameters of the actions to be performed while the 
identifier of the managing BSC determines the target 
object on which the actions must be performed. The log 
operation is performed as a local operation within the 
subject. Ponder allows the use of variables defined later on 
in the same scope, (e.g. bsc) and does not impose an order 
on declarations within a policy (e.g. subject, on, do). 
4.3. Refrain 
Refrain Policies define the actions that subjects must 
refrain from performing on target objects, and like 
obligations, they are implemented by the subject. Refrain 
policies are used for situations where negative 
authorisation policies are inappropriate, as the targets do 
not wish to be protected from the subject. A refrain can 
also be used when the subject is permitted to perform the 
action but is asked to refrain from doing so when particular 
constraints apply. Refrain policies are syntactically the 
same as negative authorisation policies. For example, staff 
should refrain from calling customers on Sunday, although 
they may be authorised to do so: 
type refrain polite-behaviour (subject staff, target subscribers) { 
1 
action call; 
when time.dayOfWeek( ) = “Sunday” ; 
4.4. Policy Hierarchies 
Policies applying to an enterprise system, such as those 
described in the Enterprise Viewpoint, may be abstract and 
need to be refined into concrete realisations in order to be 
implemented. The progressive refinement of an abstract 
policy or goal leads to a refinement hierarchy where lower 
levels realise the more abstract representation above. 
Ponder aims to specify the policies situated in the concrete 
levels of this hierarchy and that can be directly 
implemented by an automated process or a human 
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manager, possibly with the aid of an automated system. 
This explains some of the divergences from the Enterprise 
Viewpoint specification. For example, Ponder restricts 
obligation policies to those actions that must be performed 
in response to events. It requires the triggering event to be 
specified as part of the policy and does not provide the 
means of specifying non-functional descriptions such as “it 
is obligated that X occurs” which are encountered in 
deontic specifications. 
We are currently working on tool support for refining 
high-level goals into implementable policies following the 
Requirements Engineering [ 131 approach for refining goals 
into specifications. We also hope to make use of their 
approach to consistency analysis to see whether policies 
correctly satisfy goals and to include conflict analysis, 
based on our previous work [lo]. 
5. Roles and Relationships 
5.1. Specification 
In Ponder, roles are groups of policies goveming the 
behaviour of the same subject while relationships group 
the policies defining the rights and duties of roles towards 
each other. Policies that are part of a role or of a 
relationship apply to the entity assigned to the role. It is 
therefore possible to dynamically assign or remove an 
entity to a role without changing the policies of that role. 
As shown in Section 3 roles and relationships are 
themselves grouped in management structures. Policies 
grouped in roles have the same subject that is therefore not 
specified as part of each individual policy. The subject may 
either be explicitly determined upon instantiation of a role 
type or implicitly created upon instantiation. 
A Ponder role corresponds to the rights and duties 
relating to a position within an organisation, for example a 
telephone service engineer, radio network operator, a nurse 
or a doctor in a hospital. A role could also define the set of 
policies for which an automated device is the subject e.g. a 
BSC reconfiguration agent. An ODP role is an “identifier 
for a behaviour, which may appear as a parameter in a 
template for a composite object, and which is associated 
with one of the component objects of the composite 
object.” Ponder roles cannot contain other roles or be 
assigned to other roles. Furthermore, while an Enterprise 
community containing roles may be assigned to a role, 
management structures cannot be assigned to roles in 
Ponder. 
Details of how Ponder roles can be implemented in 
terms of position domains and how users or automated 
agents are assigned to roles have been described elsewhere 
[lo]. This caters for the Enterprise requirement of 
assigning different objects to roles at different times. 
The rights and duties for telephone service engineers in 
the operations of a GSM network can be written as 
follows: 
type role engineer (vlr, eir){ 
/* On a handset failure the engineer must update the 
record in the Equipment ldentity Register (eir) */ 
inst oblig update ( target eir; 
on hs-failure (x); 
do eir.update-record (x) ; } 
/* On use of grey-listed MS initiate a trace in the visitors 
location register (vlr) */ 
inst oblig trace ( target vlr; 
on grey-list-use (x) ; 
do vlr.trace-foreign (x) ; ] 
I* other policies *I 
A role type may include multiple policy and constraint 
instances as well as further type definitions and can be 
extended by specialisation. For example, a common role 
type definition can be specified for base network operators 
grouping their common rights and duties: 
type role op (set t) { 
/* Restart failed equipment in target domain */ 
inst oblig restart (target f = t {id}; 
on failure (id) ; 
do f.restart () -> f.run-self-test () ; ) 
/* other policies *I 
This specification can be extended to define the role 
types for base network operators for switches (switch-op) 
and for radio equipment (radio-op) with the specific rights 
and duties of each. 
1 
type role switch-op (set ebsc-types b, <msc-type> m) 
/* On A-interface circuit failure the circuit 
extends op (b) { 
must be blocked and reset. */ 
inst oblig reset { 
on A-failure (x, bsc) ; 
target f = b {bsc) ; 
do f.reset (x) ; ) 
inst oblig block { target m ; 
on A-failure (x, bsc) ; 
do m.block-circuit (x, bsc) ; } 
inst auth+ bsc-auth {target b ; 
action reset, disable; } 
inst auth+ msc-auth { target m ; 
action block-circuit, unblock-circuit ; } 
1 
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type role radio-op (set <bsc-type> b) extends op (b) { 
inst oblig reset { ... ] 
inst auth+ auth-station-controller ( target b ; 
action force-handoff, bar-cell, shutdown ; ] 
/* On cell-overload, force a hand-over of all 
connected mobiles */ 
inst oblig clear-cell { 
on cell-overload (bts, bsc) ; 
target f = b A (bsc}; 
do f.force-handoff (bts) ; ] 
inst oblig fail-reconfigure { 
on 
target f = b A {bsc]; 
do f.disable (bts, cir) -> 
failure (cir, bts, bsc) ; 
f.enable (bts,"backup")) ; } 
/* On 3 occurrences of a failure event report, 
increase BTS transmission */ 
inst oblig increase { 
on 3'radio-link-fail (bts, bsc) ; 
target f = b {bsc]; 
do f.increasegower(1) ; } 
I 
Specialisation of a role type is achieved by the keyword 
extends followed by the name of the role type which is 
extended and the parameter values for that role. 
Note that policies may be specified within a role as 
well as outside the role, for example as part of a 
management structure or simply applying to a domain of 
objects. 
5.2. Role Relationships 
Relationships group the rights and duties, i.e., the 
permissions, prohibitions and obligations of the related 
roles towards each other or with regards to the use of 
shared resources. A management structure may include 
several roles with different relationships between them. For 
example, in the network element management structure 
(Figure 3) there are several relationship instances between 
base network operators and network element 
administrators and a relationship of a different type 
between the two base network operators. In addition to 
policies, relationships may also define the interaction 
protocols that govern communications between the roles in 
operators collaborate with network element administrators 
and are authorised to assign them tasks. This assign-re1 
relationship type is specified below, and further specialised 
for the cases of a BNoS (switch-repair) and a BNoR 
(radio-repair) using the same inheritance mechanism as for 
roles. 
type re1 assign-re1 (administrator adqin, op operator) { 
inst auth+ assigngol {subject operator ; target admin ; 
action assign; ] 
1 
type re1 switch-repair (administrator admin, switch-op operator) 
extends assign-re1 (admin, operator) ( 
type re1 radio-repair (administrator admin, radio-op operator) 
extends assign-re1 (admin, operator) ( 
I 
This assign-re1 relationship comprises the assign-pol 
authorisation policy instance which gives base network 
operators the right to assign tasks to network element 
administrators. The subject and target of this policy are the 
participant roles of the relationship as defined by the role 
statement. Note that these roles are typed. Hence, an 
instance of this relationship can be created only between 
roles of types administrator and op respectively. This 
relationship type is further specialised and these extended 
versions require participant roles to be of types switch-op 
and radio-op which are sub-types of op. Hence, strong 
typing principles from classical object-oriented 
programming have also been applied in Ponder in order to 
maximise the compile time verification and ensure 
rigorous specifications. 
6. Group policies and other policy types 
6.1. Groups 
Groups are constructs which permit policy makers to 
group related policies together in order to instantiate all the 
policies at the same time, to share common definitions 
between the policies or to apply constraints to the set of 
policies, e.g.: 
group reset-group (set s) { 
terms of message exchanges [ 5 ] ,  however this has not yet 
been included in the current version of Ponder. A 
relationship, or a relationship type is defined in Ponder by 
specifying the roles that participate in the relationship and 
the policies associated with these role. Policies that define 
the rights and duties of the roles towards each other have 
the relevant roles as subjects and targets. For example, in 
the case of our GSM operations scenario, base network 
set b = ... /cardiff/tn/bsc/; 
extern msc-type m = ... /cardiff/tn/msc ; 
constraint active(x,bscid) = bscid.isActive(x) 
//create a reference to an object 
and m.isActive(x); 
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inst oblig reset { subjects ;target s l  ; 
on A-failure(x, bscid); 
set sl = b A (bscid}; 
do sl .reset(x) 
when active (x, bscid) 
1 
inst oblig block { subject s ; target m ; 
on A-failure (x, bscid); 
do m.block-circuit (x) ; 
when active (x, bscid) 
1 
inst auth+ bsc-auth { subjects ; target b ; 
action reset, disable; } 
inst auth+ msc-auth { subjects ; target m ; 
action block-circuit, unblock-circuit ; } 
1 
6.2. Delegation 
Ponder permits the specification of delegation policies 
which specify the subset of the permissions grantors 
possess which they are permitted to delegate to others. 
Therefore, a delegation policy in Ponder must explicitly 
refer to the authorisation policy that gives the grantors the 
permissions, a subset of which can be delegated. For 
example, base network operators may temporarily delegate 
network element administrators the right to bar a GSM 
cell. 
/* Branch network operators - radio are permitted to force 
handovers, shutdown or barr a cell controlled by a given BSC */ 
domain r = ... Icardiff/roles/ ; n = ... cardiff/tn/ ; 
inst auth+ auth-bsc { 
subject r/bnor ; 
target n/bsc/ ; 
action force-handoff, bar-cell, shutdown ; } 
/* Branch network operators - radio are permitted to delegate the 
barrCell action to network element administrators on the cell 
controlled by the BSCl */ 
inst deleg+ delegate-bar (auth-bsc) { 
target nIbscIbsc1 ; 
grantee rhea/ ; 
action bar-cell ; } 
6.3. Filters 
Defining permissions and prohibitions in terms of the 
actions that subjects are authorised or forbidden to perform 
is not sufficient in some cases. Consider for example that 
both help-desk staff and telephone service engineers may 
be permitted to query a location service in order to find the 
location of a particular subscriber. While telephone service 
engineers investigate faults and must know exactly to 
which cell the mobile station is connected, help-desk staff 
need only know if the subscriber is currently connected to 
the home network or is roaming. Filtered authorisations are 
an extension to Ponder's authorisation policies, which can 
be used in order to specify transformations to the input 
parameters or result of an action which subjects are 
permitted to perform. The location service example can be 
specified in Ponder as follows: 
type auth+ filter_location (subject s, target t) { 
action lookup ( ) if subset (s, ... IcardifflroleslhdI) { 
1 
Queries from all other staff are left unmodified while 
queries from members of the HD domain (help-desk stafo 
are filtered by applying the select function to the result. 
result = select ("Network, result) 
1 
6.4. Constraints 
Ponder uses a subset of Object Constraint Language 
(OCL) [ll] for specifying constraints which limit the 
applicability of a policy, for example to a particular time 
interval or according to the state of the system. These are 
specified as part of the individual obligation, authorisation, 
refrain and delegation policies. Semantic constraints which 
restrict the set of permissible policies (also referred to as 
Meta-Policies) can be specified as part of any composite 
policy including groups, roles, relationships and 
management structures [lo]. These are needed in order to 
determine application specific conflicts such as separation 
of duties or conflicts for resources. For example, a conflict 
of separation of duties can be specified in Ponder as 
follows: 
type meta dutyconflict (actl , act2, targ-type) raises dcevent (z) { 
[z] = self.policies -> select (pa, 
pb 1 pa.subject -> intersection(pb.subject) -> notEmpty 
and pa.action -> exists(act I act.name = actl) 
and pb.action -> exists(act I act.name = act2) 
and pb.target -> intersection(pa.target) -> 
This second policy authorises the BNoR to delegate the 
bar-cell action to objects specified in the grantee scope. 
The delegated action can be performed on objects specified 
in the target of the delegation policy, which must be a 
subset of the target scope of the authorisation policy (here 
delegate-bar policy allows him to delegate. Delegation 
policies can be positive or negative, a negative policy 
ocllsKindOf (targ-type) 
auth-bsc) that grants the subject the permissions the ) ;  
. z -> notEmpty 
This constraint can be instantiated in order to specify 
to authorise a 
specifying that the delegation -is explicitly prohibited. 
Cascaded delegation is catered for by allowing delegation 
policies to serve as basis for further delegating the 
permissions. 
' 
that the Same 
payment and initiate it: 
are not 
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inst meta dc = dutyconflict ("authorise", "initiate", "payment"); 
or that help-desk staff are not allowed to both update 
payment details and service subscriptions on customer 
records: 
inst meta ss = dutyconflict ("serviceupdate", "paymentupdate", 
"customerRecords") ; 
7. Related work 
Policy-based systems have been the subject of 
increasing research efforts recently. In particular the main 
thrust for standardisation has been undertaken within the 
IETF Policy Group (www.ietf.org/html.charters/policy- 
charter.htm1). They use a policy model highly customised 
for quality of service management and configuration 
within networks. They assume policies are objects stored 
in a directory service [14]. A policy client (e.g., a router) 
makes policy requests on a server, which retrieves the 
policy objects, interprets them and responds with policy 
decisions to the client. The client enforces the policy by, 
for example, permitting/forbidding requests or allocating 
packets from a connection to a particular queue. The IETF 
are defining a policy framework that can be used for 
classifying packet flows as well as specifying 
authorisations for network resources and services [ 151. 
They do not explicitly differentiate authorisation and 
obligation policies. A simple policy rule defines a set of 
policy actions that are performed when a set of conditions 
becomes true. These conditions correspond to a 
combination of our events and constraints for obligation 
policies. Directories are used for storing policies but not 
for grouping subjects and targets. They use dynamic 
groups that can be specified by enumeration or by 
characterisation i.e., a predicate on object attributes, We 
can achieve this by means of a constraint on policies within 
the scope of a domain. Our notation, with explicit subjects 
and targets permits us to propagate policies to where they 
are required so we combine decision and enforcement at 
subjects for obligation policies and at targets for 
authorisation policies. Our policy service disseminates 
policies to the relevant distributed agents. 
Sandhu [ 161 defines Role-Based Access Control 
(RBAC) structures using a direct inheritance of 
permissions between role instances. This permits reuse of 
permissions and follows an organisational structure in that 
more senior roles inherit the access rights of junior roles. 
However, this instance based inheritance model violates 
organisational control principles as shown by [17] and 
introduces the need to cater for a substantial number of 
exceptions as often some access rights should not be 
inherited by senior roles from junior roles. A more detailed 
comparison between our work and RBAC models is 
presented in [18], and a study on the different types of role 
hierarchies in RBAC was presented in [19]. 
There have been several attempts at defining Enterprise 
Viewpoint specifications by using the Unified Modelling 
Language UML possibly with added extensions [20], [21], 
[22]. Proposals have alternated between modelling policies 
as notes attached to the design elements, OCL constraints 
or additional extensions to UML. [21] indicates that OCL 
is not directly suitable for expressing ODP prohibitions or 
obligations. Use cases have been presented as candidates 
for specifying community objectives and collaboration 
diagrams have been proposed for specifying communities. 
These approaches encounter difficulties related to the level 
of abstraction of the specification. Enterprise Viewpoint 
specifications are intended to be more general and more 
abstract than the system design elements of UML. Hence, 
Enterprise Viewpoint concepts are not defined in UML but 
can be realised (implemented) by a design that could be 
specified in UML. For example, an authorisation policy is 
implemented by a set of objects such as capabilities, 
certificates or access control list entries, and an obligation 
can be realised by the implementation of a particular 
activity diagram or collaboration. However, the enterprise 
level description requires a more abstract representation of 
the policy than the diagram of invocations, which 
implement it. It is therefore important to be able to identify 
a minimal and concrete representation for the Enterprise 
Viewpoint concepts, which represent functional aspects of 
the system rather than encumber a design notation with 
abstract concepts that need to be implemented by other 
representations in the same notation. 
The various models proposed for defining Enterprise 
Concepts in UML are complex and differ substantially 
between them with little prospect of convergence or 
consensus. Ponder is a simple, easy to understand 
declarative language designed to be implementable. 
[23] shows how policies expressed in structured 
English and Predicate Logic can be translated into Object 
Z. The benefits of this approach are in using Z for 
verification and analysis but there is no discussion in the 
paper of how the policies could be analysed. Z would still 
have to be translated into something suitable for 
implementation. See [lo] for a discussion on conflict 
analysis for a previous version of our Policy Language. 
8. Conclusions and Further Work 
Ponder realises many enterprise viewpoint concepts 
using an intuitive, declarative language which can be 
directly mapped into an implementation. It is a typed 
language where individual policies, roles, relationships and 
management structures are themselves types. This provides 
a model that prescribes rigorous specification. 
Getting the right domain structure which reflects the 
organisational requirement for object groupings and what 
objects need to be shared is an important starting point. 
Identifying roles in terms of rights and duties associated 
with positions is the next stage. Providing a representation 
for roles within the enterprise system permits the 
distribution of responsibilities reflecting organisational 
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structure as well as analysis for auditing and review 
purposes. Role classes permit the reuse of policy 
specifications and reflect the categorisation of classes of 
employees found in many organisations. Managers 
assigned to roles do not work in isolation but collaborate in 
a complex network of various types of relationships. Our 
role framework supports specification of the rights and 
duties imposed upon the related parties and the interaction 
protocols needed for collaboration. 
We have a working editor and syntax analyser for 
Ponder and are experimenting with translation of Ponder 
into a variety of different representations - XML for ease 
of transfer and viewing by distributed administrators, Java 
for interpretation by automated agents. We are also 
mapping Ponder authorisation policies onto different 
security mechanisms - operating system mechanisms such 
as provided in Windows NT, Firewall rules or Java 
security policy. We are also developing graphical tools to 
support policy specification within a domain framework 
and policy analysis. 
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